

# Attitudes on Family Law as an Electoral Cleavage: Survey Evidence from Tunisia

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# Contextual Background: August 13, 2018



Figure: Source: [www.carthage.tn](http://www.carthage.tn)

# Contextual Background



Figure: Source: <https://www.arab48.com>

# Theory: The Cleavage Model

- Forces effecting social relationships that shape and condition voting behavior (Bartollini and Mair, 1990)
- Empirical, normative and organizational elements
- Structural cleavages: industrialization and nationalization (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967)
- Issue based cleavages: post-materialism, reproduction, foreign policy (Deegan-Krause, 2007; Karvonen Kuhnle, 2003; Lijphart, 1984)
  - Non-existent or weak outside of industrialized Western democracies (Dalton Zhu, 2008; Deegan-Krause, 2007)
  - Timing of industrialization, property rights, absence of stable party platforms (Bornschieer, 2009; Innes, 2002; Zielinski, 2002).

# Cleavages on Family Law

- An alternative source of electoral cleavage
- Family law: “legal norms governing the formation and internal relations of ... social units (Htun and Weldon, 2015)”
- Derives its source from Islamic law: Muslim world
- A major subject of debates
  - Questions on Islam, secularism, women’s rights and identity
- Approval from masses for reformation

# Cleavage Formation on Family Law

- Empirical element: Family Law
- Organizational element: push from the elite and opposition to the reformation
- Normative element: religious justification
  - “For the male, what is equal to the share of two females...”

# Contextual background: Family Law in Tunisia

- Debates regarding changing the inheritance law in the Code of Personal Status
- Enacted in 1956, derives its source from Islamic jurisprudence.
- Gains for women
  - Child custody, divorce, polygamy
- Inheritance: 2 vs. 1 as specified in Qur'an (Surah al-Nisaa)
- Absolute majority is required for the change.

- First Republic's legacy on family law
- MTI and early Ennahda: Confrontation with the regime on Family Code
- Ennahda: Evolving attitudes on the CPS
- Protests and debates for equality following the revolution
- Nidaa Tounes: Regime-successor party inheriting the legacy on women's rights



# Hypothesis on Inheritance

- **Hypothesis 1:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights are less likely to vote for Ennahda than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights.
- **Hypothesis 2:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights are more likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's inheritance rights.

# Hypothesis on Divorce

- **Hypothesis 3:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights are less likely to vote for Ennahda than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights.
- **Hypothesis 4:** Tunisians who hold more egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights are less likely to vote for Nidaa Tounes than Tunisians who hold less egalitarian opinions on women's divorce rights.

- Afrobarometer (2013)
- “If national elections were held tomorrow, which party’s candidate would you vote for?” n=1192, Ennahda=180 (15%), Nidaa=150 (12%) Undecided, do not know, would not vote, refused to answer=745 (61.4%).

- “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of men”




Figure: Individual Views about Women’s Inheritance Rights

“Women and men should have equal rights in making a decision to divorce.”




Figure: Individual Views about Women's Divorce Rights


- Multinomial Logistic Regression
  - Base party: Ennahda
  - Parties: Niddaa Tounes, Other, No Vote
- Control Variables
  - Education
  - Economic evaluations
  - Age
  - Gender
  - Religiosity-excluded in the main model

Table: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (Baseline: Ennahda)

	Nidaa Tounes	Other	No Vote
Intercept	1.13 (0.70)	0.43 (0.72)	2.98*** (0.53)
<b>Inheritance</b>	0.25** (0.09)	0.16 (0.09)	0.14* (0.07)
Women's Rights	-0.37** (0.14)	0.06 (0.13)	-0.16 (0.10)
Education	0.12* (0.05)	0.10 (0.06)	-0.04 (0.04)
Female	-0.35 (0.25)	0.26 (0.26)	0.07 (0.19)
Age	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
<b>Divorce</b>	-0.09 (0.10)	0.09 (0.10)	-0.07 (0.07)
Economic Evaluations (Tunisia)	-0.79*** (0.14)	-0.54*** (0.14)	-0.46*** (0.09)
Economic Evaluations (Self)	0.14 (0.12)	-0.10 (0.12)	-0.07 (0.09)
AIC	2330.79		
BIC	2465.85		
Log Likelihood	-1138.39		
Deviance	2276.79		
Num. obs.	1099		

\*\*\* $p < 0.001$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \* $p < 0.05$

## Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Inheritance




Opinions on Women's Equal Inheritance Rights

**Note: Only voting intentions for the two largest parties are included in the graph**

**Figure:** Predicted Probabilities for Inheritance Based on MNL



## Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Inheritance



Opinions on Women's Equal Inheritance Rights

Note: Analysis Based on Only those with Voting Choices

Figure: Predicted Probabilities for Inheritance Based on MNL (Restricted Sample)

## Post Estimation Analysis of Opinions towards Divorce




Figure: Predicted Probabilities for Divorce Based on MNL

- Culture War

- Fadhel Ben Omrane, Nidaa Tounes MP: "Essebsi was elected by women who do not like Nidaa to be in parallel with Ennahda, as they consider Ennahda to be a very dangerous organization. [By calling for equality in inheritance] Essebsi wanted to send a message to his electorate that he is for women. Now although we do not speak on this issue [inheritance], we still consider it as important for us (07/12/2019)"

## Inheritance vs divorce rights

- Religious sources: moral and ethical maxims
- Heterodoxy
- Sociological practices
- Voting behavior in emerging democracies (Dalton and Klingemann, 2009)
- Enduring cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967)
- 2019 Elections in Tunisia: Kais Saied vs Nabil Karoui

# Implications for Other Countries

Country	Court	Source	Politiciz	Manif	Protests	ID
Egypt	Islamic	Islamic	Lim	YES	YES	NO
Turkey	Secular	Secular	NO	YES	NO/NA	NO
<b>Tunisia</b>	<b>Secular</b>	<b>Islamic</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>YES</b>	<b>YES</b>
Morocco	Secular	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Algeria	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Jordan	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	YES	NO
Kuwait	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	NO/NA	NO
Palestine	Islamic	Islamic	NA	YES	NO/NA	NO
Yemen	Islamic	Islamic	NA	NO/NA	YES	NO

**Table:** A Comparison of Provisions and Popular Engagement on Family Law across MENA

# Thank you for listening

Questions and Comments

Contact: [syasun@indiana.edu](mailto:syasun@indiana.edu)

- Do opinions about family law shape the voting behavior for the largest conservative party and the regime successor party in Tunisia?
  - **Ennahda**: The largest conservative party with Islamist roots.
  - **Nidaa Tounes**: Regime successor party formed by the former elite of the First Republic.
  - Afrobarometer (2013) dataset

# Hypothesis 3: General attitudes on Women's Rights

- Islamic discourse
- Economic challenges
- **Hypothesis 3:** Individuals who hold less egalitarian attitudes on women's rights are more likely to vote for Ennahda than individuals who hold more egalitarian attitudes on women's rights



- Statement 1: “In Tunisia, women should have equal rights and receive the same treatment as men do.” Statement 2: “Women have always been subject to traditional laws and customs, and should remain so.”





Figure: Individual Views about Women's Rights

# Post-Estimation (Women's Rights)

**Post Estimation Analysis of Women's Rights on Supporting Ennahda**



- Ennahda's political stance
  - Ambiguous on inheritance issue until 2018
  - Salafis vs a more egalitarian base
  - 2018 announcement
  - Economic challenges in Tunisia, rise of "The Block", experiences with governance

Table: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results (Baseline: Ennahda)

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Nidaa (1)	CPR (2)	Workers (3)	Front (4)	Other (5)	No Vote (6)
Inheritance	1.280*** (0.086)	1.227* (0.116)	1.155 (0.147)	0.965 (0.198)	1.228 (0.138)	1.155** (0.069)
Women's Rights	0.686*** (0.139)	1.188 (0.173)	1.285 (0.229)	0.849 (0.286)	0.885 (0.216)	0.852* (0.097)
Education	1.132** (0.054)	1.081 (0.076)	1.225** (0.096)	0.920 (0.125)	1.162* (0.086)	0.960 (0.043)
Female	0.702 (0.252)	1.453 (0.352)	2.529* (0.482)	0.960 (0.543)	0.835 (0.408)	1.077 (0.192)
Age	1.006 (0.008)	1.000 (0.012)	0.998 (0.017)	0.953** (0.022)	0.989 (0.014)	1.002 (0.007)
Divorce	0.912 (0.097)	1.153 (0.145)	1.401 (0.225)	1.033 (0.201)	0.912 (0.157)	0.928 (0.073)
Economic Evaluations (Tunisia)	0.451*** (0.136)	0.850 (0.178)	0.372*** (0.288)	0.724 (0.331)	0.379*** (0.258)	0.627*** (0.094)
Economic Evaluations (Self)	1.154 (0.116)	0.742* (0.171)	1.125 (0.200)	0.593* (0.279)	1.142 (0.179)	0.936 (0.092)
Constant	3.095 (0.699)	0.215 (1.000)	0.038** (1.486)	8.069 (1.430)	1.045 (1.147)	19.751*** (0.531)
Akaike Inf. Crit.	2,677.671					

Note:

\*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01


## Table: Logistic Regression Analysis

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Intercept	-2.76 *** (0.43)	-2.21 *** (0.32)	-2.79 *** (0.28)	-5.27 *** (1.22)	-2.34 *** (0.49)
Inheritance	-0.19 ** (0.07)	-0.19 ** (0.07)	-0.17 † (0.09)	-0.17 ** (0.07)	-0.18 ** (0.07)
Divorce	0.03 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.07 (0.07)	0.09 (0.07)
Female	-0.11 (0.18)		-0.07 (0.21)	-0.33 (0.40)	-0.03 (0.18)
Age	-0.00 (0.01)			0.00 (0.01)	0.00 (0.01)
Education	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)	0.03 (0.04)
Economy (Egocentric)	0.06 (0.09)				
Economy (Sociotropic)	0.53 *** (0.09)		0.56 *** (0.07)		
Women's Rights		0.19 * (0.09)		0.12 (0.12)	0.18 * (0.09)
Inheritance*Female			-0.03 (0.13)		
Economy (PCA)				0.11 (0.11)	0.10 (0.10)
Religiosity				1.09 ** (0.37)	
Women's Rights*Female				0.13 (0.18)	
<i>N</i>	1132	1121	1138	1078	1099
AIC	889.77	923.78	896.34	881.94	904.39
BIC	1050.79	1024.22	1037.38	1081.25	1064.46
log <i>L</i>	-412.89	-441.89	-420.17	-400.97	-420.20

Standard errors in parentheses

† significant at  $p < .10$ ; \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$

	Women's Rights	Inheritance	Age	Female	Religiosity	Divorce	Education	Economy (Egocentric)	Economy (Sociotropic)	Economy (PCA)
Women's Rights	1									
Inheritance	-0.2	1								
Age	-0.03	0.02	1							
Female	-0.17	0.17	-0.05	1						
Religiosity	0	-0.02	0	0.03	1					
Divorce	-0.23	0.25	-0.01	0.15	0.01	1				
Education	-0.08	-0.11	-0.38	-0.14	0.01	0.14	1			
Economy (Egocentric)	0	-0.04	-0.08	0.03	0.05	0.08	0.25	1		
Economy (Sociotropic)	0.03	-0.06	0.06	-0.03	0.07	0.04	0.07	0.47	1	
Economy (PCA)	0.02	0.01	0.13	-0.06	-0.01	-0.07	-0.23	-0.8	0.16	1



Note: Sample restricted to only respondents with a party choice

Figure: Marginal Effects (Restricted Sample)